1 Thanks to Stewart Cohen, Josh Dever, and two anonymous readers at Oxford University Press for helpful feedback. 2 I also take this to be one of the central messages of Timothy Williamson's The Philosophy of Philosophy. It is also a point made forcefully by Max Deutsch (2009 Deutsch ( , 2010 . 3 The x-phi movement is sometimes described as divided into a negative and a positive or constructive camp. For the constructive experimental philosophers, the study of intuitions can help us do philosophy. The focus in this chapter is on the negative camp, but it is worth noting that the positive version of the program is equally committed to the assumption that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. It endorses that assumption and then tries to make a positive contribution by discovering interesting facts about the patterns of intuitive reactions. As a result, the objections in this chapter (and in PWI) are, if effective at all, equally effective against both camps.
• Quotation is governed by the axiom: 'A' quotes ''A''.
• Agreement and disagreement patterns do not provide evidence for relativism about predicates of taste.
• A monadic truth predicate is more fundamental than a relational truth predicate.
• Disagreement diagnostics for shared content are better than samesaying diagnostics for shared content.
To conduct a survey about what, e.g., undergraduates in New Jersey and Hong Kong believe about quotation or monadic truth would be pointless in the extreme. So, if we find out, for example, that 8.2 percent more students in HK believe in monadic truth than in NJ, that isn't helpful to my philosophical practice, the goal of which is to find out whether truth is monadic or not. It is pointless because to engage with my beliefs about monadic truth you have to engage with my reasoning and the evidence that I have. The surveys don't do that and so don't speak to my philosophical concerns. and HK undergraduates, it wouldn't move me and it would have no bearing on the debate about whether truth is monadic or relativized.
Option 3: Replace 'intuitions' with 'philosophically relevant judgments about cases that we have no evidence for and don't base on reasons'
Weinberg says:
Intuitions are odd critters: intellectual happenings in which it seems to us that something is the case without arising from our inferring it from any reasons that it is so, or our sensorily perceiving that it is so, or our having a sense of remembering that it is so. (2007, p. 318) Nichols et al. say:
As we use the notion, an epistemic intuition is simply a spontaneous judgment about the epistemic properties of some specific case-a judgment for which the person making the judgment may be able to offer no plausible justification. (2001, p. 432) .
Again, there is a way to purge these passages of 'intuition'-talk and the remaining proposal is what I suspect is at the core of x-phi's picture (or caricature) of philosophical practice: at the foundation of much philosophy is a set of case judgments made by philosophers without evidence or reasons-they are made spontaneously, quickly, and 'intuitively'. We read e.g. a Gettier case, or a Truetemp case, and-boom!-a judgment about the case just comes to us. If it were true that philosophers relied on such spontaneous responses as foundational evidence, then it might be very interesting to learn that they vary widely with philosophically irrelevant factors.
The problem for x-phi is that this model of case judgments is false. In all of the cases anyone has ever mentioned as examples of philosophical case judgments, the judgments are made based on reasons and evidence and are assessed on that basis. This is a point at which I have to refer readers to earlier work. PWI goes through many cases (or thought experiments) in detail and finds none that fit the Option 3-caricature. I will provide only one illustration here (not included in PWI). Consider Stewart Cohen's (1999) 
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Cohen then goes on to consider two more options. He considers the options carefully and his conclusion is reached tentatively; the difficulty and complexity is emphasized throughout. As I show in PWI, this is paradigmatic of how philosophers engage with cases.
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The central point I want to emphasize is this: if a proponent of x-phi endorses Option 3, a philosophical judgment (or activity of some kind) is an appropriate target for x-phi just in case it has certain features (they have to be, e.g., intellectual happenings in which it seems to us that something is so even though we don't have reasons for judging that that it is so, etc.). We are, for each candidate target, owed some evidence that it (the judgment or activity) has those features. X-phi practitioners never provide such evidence and seem to not even recognize a burden to provide it.
As the reader can confirm by looking at the quoted Cohen passages above, even cursory glance at the paradigm targets make it extremely unlikely that such evidence will be forthcoming. Philosophical engagement with cases simply doesn't fit the Option 3 mold.
Option 4: Replace 'intuitions' with 'philosophically relevant beliefs about cases made quickly or using System-1 processing (as opposed to System-2 processing)'
Option 4 is very close to Option 3, but it gains, at least in some eyes, respectability by being framed in terminology borrowed from a branch of experimental psychology.
Here is Jennifer Nagel's characterization of the kind of judgment good x-phi should target (she is using 'intuition'-vocabulary, but the context makes it easy to see how that can be replaced with an 'intuition'-free description of the relevant kind of judgment):
Both in philosophy and in psychology, intuitive judgments are seen in contrast to the judgments we produce through deliberate reasoning.
Because Option 4 proposes that x-phi targets judgments of the first category, not the second.
My response is by now predictable: for anyone doing philosophy, it will come as a huge surprise to be told that philosophers' judgments about cases belong in the first and not the second category. It is, for reasons given above, simply false that the parts of philosophy Nagel and other practitioners of experimental philosophy target fall into the first category (the one many psychologists label 'intuitive'). No evidence has ever been provided by any proponent of x-phi and recent studies of philosophical practice throw serious doubt on it. 6 The passage from Cohen illustrates the general point.
Cohen thought about the airport case for years, it wasn't quick and it is obvious from the text that it doesn't fit Nagel's description of what x-phi targets. In sum: while there is no doubt that System 1 judgments are an important psychological category that psychologists now have interesting insights into, this fails to have any relevance to philosophers' judgments about cases.
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Option 5: Replace 'intuitions' with 'philosophically relevant judgments about cases based on nothing but conceptual competence'
A natural thought: the problem with Options 3 and 4 is that the judgments in question are claimed to have no evidence in their favor. What we are looking for, rather, are judgments with a distinctive kind of evidence in their favor. One common view is that the target judgments about cases are those based solely on conceptual competence.
Here is yet another of Weinberg's characterizations of his target:
no empirical evidence is required, because one is presumed to have stipulated all the contingencies in the construction of the hypothetical, and one is thus applying only one's mastery of the concepts involved and not any empirical knowledge. (2007, p. 320) So the target judgments are not without any justification, they are instead based on a distinctive source of evidence: conceptual competence. This version of x-phi goes hand in hand with the view of philosophy-and reflections on thought experiments in particular-as an a priori, armchair, enterprise.
There is much to be said about this way of describing philosophical judgments, and (as with Option 3) much of what I have to say is spelled out in considerably more detail in PWI (see chs 7, 8, 9, and in particular 10). I will simply highlight three important concerns:
1. An x-phi practitioner who advocates Option 5 needs to do a great deal of work in order to establish that a particular claim is an appropriate target-i.e. that it is 'based on nothing but conceptual competence'. No 6 See PWI, Part II. 7 I should note that Nagel also says, "Even if we need some mixture of intuitive and reflective cognition to follow the story, it is possible that we use intuitive processing across the board in determining whether the key mental state in the story is an instance of knowledge or mere belief" (2012, p. 500). This indicates a kind of mixed picture. I suspect that when this is worked out, the result is a version of Option 6 below.
proponent of x-phi has ever tried to substantiate this about any of their targets. 8 Nor have they provided evidence that the original authors of the thought experiments treated them in that way. To do that would require serious philosophical work: before preparing a survey, the xphi practitioner would have to tell us what she means by 'concept', 'competence' and 'based on nothing but' and then show how, in the target cases, the relevant judgment has (or is believed to have) these
properties. Significant parts of PWI are devoted to showing how prima facie implausible this is as a description of typical x-phi targets. In chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10, I first develop diagnostics for when a philosopher is attempting to rely on nothing but conceptual competence-i.e. for when a restriction of the form 'don't base the judgment on anything but conceptual competence' is in effect. I then consider a series of case studies in chapter 8 and none of them fit that description. analysis' as it is traditionally understood is impossible to engage in.
The search for conceptual justification is like the search for unicorns.
This would present a problem for the Option 5-version of x-phi: they would be targeting an activity in which it is impossible to engage (they are in effect targeting nothing). PWI, on the other hand, argues against Option 5 without assuming Williamson's strong conclusion (i.e. PWI doesn't assume that the notion of a judgment relying on nothing but 8 And I don't mean this as a form of hyperbole-it is literally true: no one has even tried. 9 This is despite the fact that many philosophers-in moments of meta-reflection-might describe what they do as some form of conceptual analysis. That is simply a mis-description of what they actually do. A general theme of PWI is that we should not take philosophers' meta-descriptions at face value (no more than we should take mathematicians' or economists' descriptions of the nature of their disciplines at face value).
conceptual competence is empty Suppose she has established about a particular target judgment that it is based 'solely on conceptual competence' (or that author intends for it to be so based). She will then have to show how responses to surveys are relevant to an evaluation of that judgment. It is hard to overemphasize how difficult a task this is. She must, in effect, show that subjects 'rely on nothing but conceptual competence' when responding to the survey (and are not, for example, just making a spontaneous, System 1 judgment). Otherwise, the judgments of the survey respondents and the judgments of the targeted philosophers aren't of the same type (and so, again, there is a mystery why the one should tell us anything about the other). No x-phi survey has ever even attempted to produce evidence of this kind of match.
11
Before leaving Option 5 it is worth drawing attention to a little argument that can be extracted from the Weinberg quote (2007) that started this section. Recall Weinberg saying, "no empirical evidence is required, because one is presumed to have stipulated all the contingencies in the construction of the hypothetical …." The argument seems to be of the form: "The reasoning must be based just on conceptual competence, because we've been given so much starting information to reason from."
But that's a bizarre line of thought: surely, the amount of details built into the case is •
I1:
The judger takes herself already to have evidence for p, in a manner substantial enough to license p prima facie as a justifier without need of further offered justification.
•
I2:
The justification the judger takes herself to have for p "is not itself wholly based on perceptual input, memory, testimony, or inference from such judgments" (note that this leaves open the possibility that the intuitive judgment may partially involve such sources-thereby distinguishing this proposal from Option 3).
• I3: The judger assumes that there is some non-standard justification for p that complements the justification she has from 'standard sources'.
So, roughly, Weinberg's idea is that there are important claims about cases in which the agent has a confidence level that exceeds what the 'standard' evidence justifies.
The agent also believes that some 'non-standard source of evidence' will fill the 12 Thanks to Josh Dever for drawing my attention to this problem-argument in the passage from Weinberg. 13 Weinberg also thinks this is how 'intuition' should be characterized, so he takes this as a defense of the claim that philosophers rely on intuitions. Since the current chapter assumes we are better off purging our discussions of 'intuition' vocabulary, I ignore this aspect of Weinberg's proposal (though see Cappelen (Forthcoming) for a refutation of this aspect of Weinberg's proposal). 14 It's unclear whether these are necessary or sufficient conditions. the ordinariness of his cases-how they are ubiquitous. 15 But, as the last thirty years of philosophy have proved, these are extremely hard cases to make judgments about. I suspect the charitable interpretation of Weinberg is that he is focusing on esoteric, unusual, and farfetched cases that are difficult and that it is the great degree of difficulty that distinguishes his target, not that they are esoteric, unusual, or farfetched. So, let's consider JW2:
JW2: Philosophers' practice of making judgments about very difficult cases is particularly unreliable. It is such judgments that are vulnerable to the experimentalist's challenge.
JW2 moves dangerously close to triviality. Of course we are less reliable when we make very difficult judgments. That's true in general-it is not a surprising feature of philosophical practice. When we try to answer very hard questions, we are not as reliable as we are when we try to answer easy questions. Surveys of undergraduate responses to vignettes won't make finding the answer any easier.
Option 8 Most of it is just straightforward attempts to contribute to the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science. simply trying to discover cognitive biases. Do I mean to reject all attempts to discover biases that philosophers might suffer from? In response to this concern, it might help to sketch the kind of dialogue I sometimes have with proponents of x-phi. In what follows, X-P is someone trying to explain to me the value of x-phi surveys and HC presents my reply. 
X-P:

Conclusion
The offhand remarks we get from x-phi lovers about how to do x-phi without intuitions are unhelpful. They give the impression that it's a tiny adjustment hardly worth mentioning other than in a parenthetical remark. That's deeply misleading: the issues raised are complicated and the threat to x-phi is serious. In sum, a foundational problem threatens x-phi: the movement has been based on a speculative, nonempirical approach to its subject matter. Before you can claim that a survey (or a study of any kind) shows something important about an activity or a group of people, you need carefully to study what those people do and what that activity is. Proponents of x-phi have bought into a caricature of philosophy and they need to do more careful empirical work to identity a genuine target. Here is an analogy of what has been going on: suppose experimental philosophers decided to investigate philosophers' diet, rather than their judgments about thought experiments. We can all agree that the following would be an extraordinarily ill-conceived strategy: pick some chemical, XYZ, and then conduct various experiments on it before checking whether philosophers consume XYZ. Even if the philosophy-diet-experimenters discover that 17 Stew Cohen suggested that in the spirit of reconciliation, this piece of dialogue be added: X-P: Okay, maybe x-phi surveys are irrelevant to finished work by professional philosophers, but, surely, even professional philosophers occasionally engaged in quick, non-reflective philosophical reflections and conversations-can x-phi studies be relevant to what they do during those informal moments? HC: Maybe, it's an empirical question-one would need to do empirical studies to show the relevance, it can't be just a priori assumed. And one would then need evidence of the kind of effect this had on the finished work.
